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North Carolina Public Employee
Health Plans Must Cover Gender
Affirming Healthcare

Federal Court Rules That North Carolina Violated the
Constitution and Title VII by Excluding Coverage for
Gender Transition from Its Public Employee Health Plan
By Arthur S. Leonard
U.S. District Judge Loretta C. Biggs
ruled on June 10, 2022, that the State
of North Carolina violated the 14th
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII’s anti-discrimination
requirements by providing a health
insurance plan for state employees
and their dependents that categorically
excludes coverage for treatments
“leading to or in connection with sex
changes or modifications” from the
state health insurance plan. The court
issued a permanent injunction against
enforcement of the exclusion for
medically necessary gender-affirming
care. Kadel v. Folwell, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 103780, 2022 WL 2106270
(M.D. N.C., June 10, 2022).
The exclusion written into the formal
plan, known as the North Carolina State
Health Plan for Teachers and State
Employees (NCSHP), excludes both
psychological assessment and treatment
as well as “treatment or studies leading
to or in connection with sex changes or
modifications and related care.” Thus,
on its face the plan deprives employees
and their dependents of coverage for
counseling, hormone therapy, or any
surgical treatment related to gender
transition. However, the state claims
that it has not enforced the exclusion
regarding counseling, so the focus of
the case moved to treatment.
The original complaint, filed on
March 11, 2019, alleged violations of
the Equal Protection Clause, Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972,
and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care
Act, naming as defendants both the
state officials responsible for running
the plan and three North Carolina
public state universities.
The defendants moved to dismiss
the case, claiming that the plan did not
discriminate based on gender identity,
and even if it did, the complaint failed
to state a legal claim because neither the
Supreme Court nor the 4th Circuit had

ruled definitively that discrimination
because of gender identity violates
federal laws against sex discrimination.
The court denied the defendants’
motion, 446 F.Supp.3d 1 (M.D.N.C.,
Mar. 11, 2020), and was upheld by the
4th Circuit Court of Appeals. 12 F.4th
422 (4th Cir., Sep. 01, 2021, as amended
Dec 02, 2021). The Supreme Court
rejected the state’s motion to review
that ruling on January 18, 2022, 142 S.
Ct. 861.
Significant legal developments took
place in the interim, most importantly
the 4th Circuit rendering a final
decision in Gavin Grimm’s gender
identity discrimination case under Title
IX against a Virginia School District,
Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 972
F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir.), as amended
(Aug. 28, 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
Ct. 2878, 210 L. Ed. 2d 977 (2021),
and the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct.
1731 in June 2020, holing that because
it is impossible to discriminate against
somebody due to their transgender
status without discriminating, at least
in part, because of their sex, such
discrimination violated Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although
Justice Neil Gorsuch, writing for the
Court, said that the only question
the Court was deciding was whether
claims for discrimination because of
sexual orientation or transgender status
could be brought under Title VII, in
January 2021 President Joe Biden’s
first Executive Order embraced the
Bostock ruling and asserted that its
reasoning applied to all federal laws
banning sex discrimination. The Biden
interpretation, as adopted by federal
agencies, is under challenge in several
different lawsuits.
Shortly after the Bostock ruling was
announced, the plaintiffs amended their
complaint in August 2020 to add another
plaintiff, a transgender state employee

who asserted a claim of discrimination
in employee benefits in violation of Title
VII. Since health insurance is a form of
compensation as an employee benefit,
such discrimination would come within
the ambit of Title VII. The Title VII
claim was asserted against both the plan
and the agency for which this additional
plaintiff worked, the Department of
Public Safety (DPS).
The Supreme Court’s refusal to
review the 4th Circuit’s decision on
Judge Biggs’ denial of defendants’
motion to dismiss, taken together with
the 4th Circuit’s Grimm ruling, was
enough to persuade the universities
to settle the claims against them,
leaving the state health plan’s leaders
(the State Treasurer and the Executive
Director of the Plan) and DPS as the
remaining defendants. Thus, the Title
IX claim fell out of the case, although
the interpretation of Title IX will be
relevant if Judge Biggs eventually rules
on the Affordable Care Act (ACA)
claim. After discovery, the plaintiffs
and defendants moved for summary
judgment on the issue of liability under
Equal Protection, Title VII, and the
ACA, with the understanding that if the
court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, there
would have to be a trial later on the
issue of damages if the parties did not
settle plaintiffs’ monetary claims. (The
issue of injunctive relief is not up to a
jury.)
Before addressing the merits of the
plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, Judge
Biggs devoted considerable discussion to
the plaintiffs’ motion to block testimony
by various “expert witnesses” presented
by the state, all of whom were deposed
during discovery. After detailed analysis
of their proposed testimony, contrasted
with the plaintiff’s expert testimony
provided through an extensive amicus
brief by a group of major medical
professional associations, the judge
exercised her function as a gatekeeper
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against irrelevant or unqualified expert
testimony by significantly limiting
what the “experts” could testify about
in connection with this case. In such a
contest, the broad consensus of highly
respected professional associations
will weigh heavily against the views of
dissenting “outliers.”
Judge Biggs found that many of the
“expert” opinions concerning genderaffirming care espoused by defendants’
experts were not supported by the kind
of research and data that is necessary to
allow experts to offer their professional
opinions in evidence. Their testimony
was similar in many respects to the
sort of “expert testimony” that has been
ruled out in many lawsuits challenging
anti-transgender discrimination in
schools, health care, and employment.
Several of them referred scornfully to
a “Transgender Treatment Industry”
that was attempting to “silence open
public debate on the risks and benefits
of transgender medical procedures
and political ideologies.” The judge
noted that some of the experts were
“connected” to Alliance Defending
Freedom, which battles to defend
transphobic policies from a religious
perspective.
Turning to the merits of the case,
Judge Biggs relied heavily on the
Supreme Court’s Bostock ruling and
the 4th Circuit’s Grimm ruling for her
key holdings. Although the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on whether
gender identity discrimination claims
merit “heightened scrutiny” under
the Equal Protection Clause, which
would require the state to show that it
had a highly persuasive reason for its
discriminatory policy, the Supreme
Court has established such a standard
for sex discrimination claims. Judge
Biggs found that the reasoning of
the Bostock decision supported the
plaintiffs’ arguments for heightened
scrutiny on their equal protection claim
as a form of sex discrimination, and
that the state’s justifications were not
sufficient to withstand such scrutiny.
The judge rejected the defendants’
argument that their policy was not
discriminatory against transgender
individuals. She found it discriminatory
on its face, commenting that “the broad
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language of the Plan distinguishes
between medically necessary treatments
that align with the member’s biological
sex and medically necessary treatments
– often the same medically necessary
treatments – that do not align with his
sex.” Thus, the plan discriminates based
on sex. Indeed, she wrote, the plan
“transparently discriminates against
its transgender members,” rejecting
the defendants’ argument that the plan
discriminates based on “diagnosis,”
rather than on the identity of people. The
opinion includes a lengthy, sophisticated
dissection of the defendant’s arguments,
weaving in key aspects of the Grimm
and Bostock rulings to bolster the
court’s conclusion of a constitutional
violation, and noting that one of the
defendants’ experts had conceded that
gender-affirming care is appropriate in
some cases, which cuts directly against
the plan’s categorical exclusion of such
care.
Judge Biggs granted summary
judgment to the plan on the Title VII
claim, however, finding that the plan
is not an employer or the agent of an
employer under that statute, which
applies only to discrimination in
employment.
However, the judge granted summary
judgment to the plaintiffs on the Title
VII claim against the Department of
Public Safety (DPS), the employer of
the plaintiff, even though it argued that
it had nothing to do with dictating the
content of the plan, but merely provided
insurance to its employees through
the state plan as required by state law.
Summoning the reasoning that she had
used in her earlier ruling to deny the
universities’ motions to dismiss the
Title IX claims, Judge Biggs found that
although DPS did not make the decision
to exclude gender-affirming healthcare
coverage, nonetheless as an employer
offering that plan to its employees as
part of their compensation, it could be
held liable under Title VII for providing
a plan with such an exclusion.
Thus, she concluded, the DPS
employee who was denied coverage
for gender-affirming care could assert
the Title VII discrimination claim
against his employer and has a claim
for damages. This plaintiff received

hormone treatments and surgery to
transition, but was denied insurance
coverage and had to come up with
substantial money for these services on
her own, and thus had a compensable
injury. “The fact that DPS did not create
the plan or decide what it covered is
not dispositive,” wrote the judge. “Put
simply, if DPS had not provided [the
plaintiff] with discriminatory health
insurance, she would not have been
injured. DPS’s conduct is therefore a
but-for cause of her injury.”
Judge Biggs refrained from ruling
on the Affordable Care Act claim
for the simple reason that whether
an insurance plan can be sued for
discrimination under the ACA is up in
the air because of a regulation adopted
by the Trump Administration, which
interpreted the discrimination provision
to apply only to the providers of health
care, not to insurance companies and
plans. The validity of that regulation
is much contested, and the Biden
Administration has indicated it will be
replaced with a new one, although the
process of repealing and replacing a
regulation is time-consuming under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Judge
Biggs decided that a ruling on the ACA
claim could await that development, and
the wait was not harmful to plaintiffs,
because she was already ruling in their
favor on the Equal Protection and Title
VII claims.
To effectuate her summary judgment
ruling, the judge issued an order that
will “permanently enjoin NCSHP from
enforcing the Plan’s exclusion and
order NCSHP to reinstate coverage
for ‘medically necessary services of
treatment for gender dysphoria.’” She
also granted the plaintiffs’ motion to
place under seal portions of the expert
reports and testimony in the court
records that describe in detail the
medical records of individual plaintiffs
in the case, in order to protect their
privacy rights.
In concluding her opinion, Judge
Biggs asserted that “politics and
emotion are not admissible as evidence
in a court of law. Plaintiffs’ doctors,
their experts, every major medical
association, and Defendant’s own thirdparty administrators all agree that, in

certain cases, gender affirming medical
and surgical care can be medically
necessary to treat gender dysphoria.
Defendants attempt to create scientific
controversy in this uniform agreement
through experts who mix their scientific
analysis with hypothetical speculation
and political hyperbole. Only science
that is relevant, reliable, and offered
by a qualified expert is admissible,
however, and the admissible portions
of Defendants’ expert’s testimony, even
when taken in the light most favorable to
Defendants, do not justify the exclusion
at issue. Defendants’ belief that gender
affirming care is ineffective and
unnecessary is simply not supported
by the record. Consequently, their
categorical sex- and transgender-based
exclusion of gender affirming treatments
from coverage unlawfully discriminates
against Plaintiffs in violation of the U.S.
Constitution and Title VII.”
The defendants have an important
strategic decision to make. They can try
to appeal this ruling to the 4th Circuit
and ultimately the Supreme Court, they
can go to trial and let a jury determine
the damages and then haggle over the
amount in a posttrial motion, or they
can follow the pragmatic lead of the
state universities and settle the case.
The plaintiffs are represented by
Lambda Legal, the Transgender Legal
Defense and Education Fund, and
attorneys from McDermott Will &
Emery LLP. The influential amicus brief
on behalf of the American Psychiatric
Association and several other major
professional health care associations
was produced by Brooks, Pierce,
McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, of
Greensboro and Raleigh, N.C.
Judge Biggs was appointed to the
district court by President Barack
Obama. She also presided in a case
challenging North Carolina’s refusal
to issue new birth certificates for
transgender individuals without proof of
“sex reassignment surgery,” which was
recently settled on terms satisfactory
to the plaintiffs. See separate article
below. ■
Arthur Leonard is the Robert F. Wagner
Professor of Labor & Employment Law
Emeritus at New York Law School.

U.S. District Court Denies Preliminary
Injunction to High School Christian Club
Seeking Official Recognition Contrary
to School’s Anti-Discrimination Policy
By Jason Miranda
Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. of
the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California denied a motion
for preliminary injunction brought by
the Fellowship of Christian Athletes
against the San Jose Unified School
District Board of Education. Fellowship
of Christian Athletes v. San Jose
Unified Sch. Bd. Of Educ., 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97738, 2022 WL 1786574
(N.D. Cal. June 1, 2022). The plaintiff,
Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA),
is an “international religious ministry”
that claims the San Jose Unified School
Board District) violated the Equal
Access Act (EAA), and the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution when it denied official
recognition as a student group.
The District has a non-discrimination
policy for all school-recognized
and sponsored activities, requiring
that all activities “shall be free from
discrimination based on gender, gender
identity and expression, race, color,
religion, […], sexual orientation or
the perception of one or more of such
characteristics.” The FCA requires
representatives to affirm FCA’s Christian
beliefs, where they “shall not subscribe
to or promote any religious beliefs
inconsistent with these beliefs.” As
part of their conduct standards, student
leaders within FCA clubs must agree
with the “Sexual Purity Statement”
which dictates the belief that marriage
is between “one man and one woman
in a lifelong commitment.” A previous
version of this statement, which is the
one originally brought to the District,
explicitly condemns homosexual acts
and relations.
District high schools, including
Pioneer, Willow Glen, and Leland, all
recognize student organizations under
the Associated Student Body (ASB).
Recognition is conditional on acceptance

and commitment to the District’s nondiscrimination policy. Around April 2019,
a teacher at Pioneer posted the FCA’s
Sexual Purity Statement on a classroom
whiteboard, expressing concern and
disappointment in the policy, and inviting
students to comment. As a result, around
May 2019, the District revoked ASB
recognition for FCA chapters at Pioneer,
Willow Glen, and Leland high schools
citing the non-discrimination policy.
The District maintained that FCA was
in violation by asking student leaders to
agree with certain religious beliefs that
they found to be objectionable.
ASB-recognized club leaders are
required to affirm statements similar
to those of the non-discrimination
policy, ensuring that leaders allow any
student currently enrolled at the school
to join, participate, and be allowed to
hold positions of leadership within the
club. The District requires that student
leaders not adopt any policy that
restricts membership, participation, or
leadership based on any of the protected
characteristics/associations within the
non-discrimination policy, even listing
them in their entirety. The policy
does allow for non-discriminatory
criteria such as regular attendance,
active participation, or even academic
performance.
Upon losing recognition, Pioneer
FCA became a “student interest group”
which, while not enjoying the benefits of
school funding or yearbook participation,
is still allowed to meet on campus. The
other two chapters simply dissolved. As a
result, while FCA was given conditional
approval during the 2020-2021 school
year due to the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, it was denied recognition the
following year. FCA sought a mandatory
preliminary injunction which would
allow it to be ASB-recognized while the
lawsuit proceeds.
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